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司徒文與岡崎久彥論台灣

週日 2013年10月13日, 4:02 下午【點此取得本文短網址】

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美國在台協會(AIT)前台北處長司徒文(William A. Stanton)談到台灣戰略地位的重要時說,兩岸關係發展不只影響台灣,還影響亞洲,甚至是整個世界。但如果兩岸統一,台灣變成中國的一部份時,美國就不會再援助台灣了。司徒文說得算直接。


(相關新聞:http://newtalk.tw/news/2013/10/11/40900.html )

但我比較開心的,是司徒文演講主題的核心-台灣的戰略重要性,提到其主要論述參考是引用日本前外交官岡崎久彥(Okazaki Hisahiko)的文章-台灣的戰略價值(The Strategic Value of Taiwan),司徒文特別提到這篇文章是在2003年美日台三方戰略對話的東京回合(U.S.-Japan-Taiwan Trilateral Dialogue, Tokyo Round, 2003)所發表的。這正是台灣智庫從2002年八月開始啟動的系列美日台三邊戰略對話中的東京回合(第二回合),岡崎大使在其中所發表的演說。岡崎在發表前有先給我們看,確認美日台三方都同意,他才對外發表出來。

當年美日台三邊對話提出許多想法,也在實際上改變了部份台灣與日本戰略社區對台海議題的想像、也對時下的一中政策與台灣民主發展的內在矛盾有更清楚的掌握。雖然結果不盡人意,包括美國、日本與台灣內部都有對話參與者無法掌握的變數或自身沒有看到的問題,導致當初的努力無法竟其功。但沒想到十年前我們啟動對話背後的戰略主張,竟然會被一個當時不在場的美國資深外交官在十年後作為其呼籲的主要論據。果然岡崎大使當時說得沒錯,清楚正確的戰略主張是可以經得起時間的考驗,人云亦云與對當道的逢迎諂媚所產生的知識垃圾一定會被時間淘汰。

岡崎當時會那麼說的理由之一,是參與者的主張在各自的國內都不是主流。參與者也同時於各自的國家的知識社群分別打戰略典範革命的論述戰爭。別看今天在台灣好像尋求美日台合作是再明顯不過的事,當時對日與對美關係的思考可都還侷限在「美-中-台」、「日-中-台」三角架構下,就是現在馬政府的基本想法(馬是在這個架構下,再發展出其兩岸高於所有對外關係的戰略邏輯)。

由於這個架構在美國與日本也是主流,所以當談到結合台灣與美日同盟時,馬上就被美、日的中國通們的全力封阻,美國的日本通與日本的美國通雖然對此建議採開放態度,但也不確定這與他們的關係為何,這個對話實際上協助發展出台灣自身為何重要,為何美日需要與台灣合作,而不是將台灣做為日中或美中關係的function?正是在這一點上這個對話提出重要戰略思考貢獻。

有人常常以為美日台合作是圍堵中國的聯線,這種講法沒注意到台灣本身的重要性,更重要的,是過度重視中國因素也會使美日台三邊合作處在一個搖搖欲墜的基礎上,這是因為你無法預測美、日、台面對中國時的各自反應與利益計算。因此與其被一個外在因素支配三方合作議程,更應該找出此三者的內在連繫,才是發展永續戰略經營的基礎。

美日台對話者當時嘗試在各自的官僚群進行戰略說服,但當時既有體制的反彈力道很大,政務官可能會同意,但不知道用什麼政策工具完成,而掌握知識工具以擬定政策的資深官僚當時則相當抵制,反而是日本一些中階的課長級官員私下十分贊成,美方這邊,則是屬泛亞派戰略傳統之智庫界會比較認同,負責管理日常關係運作的職業外交官往往相對保留。

但十年過去,日本當時這些中階課長現在都已成為外務省高階官員,也有的現在變成安倍的主要安保顧問。而美方的pivot,也在體制上讓當年泛亞派觀點出發的策略更容易獲得採用。反而是台灣現在反其道而行。不過我相信(或期待吧)這不會太久,The stars are aligning at the right places,一個本質上錯誤的政策不會因北京的撐持而繼續下去。看當年馬英九對中經濟開放會帶來台灣大發達的牛皮,現在還有多少人會相信? 另一方面,如果司徒文演說象徵真的要十年磨劍才能成功,那麼出鞘的日子距離現在是否就不遠了呢?

給自己來個小確幸一下,如果十年前的想法在今天獲得夠多認同,發現在未來可能有實現的機會,當年捨我其誰,以一擋百的戰鬥豪氣就會再回來吧!

附上岡崎在十年前的演講

The Strategic Value of Taiwan

Hisahiko OKAZAKI
Prepared for
The US-Japan-Taiwan Trilateral Strategic Dialogue,
Tokyo Round,
March 2, 2003

I: What is strategy?

To discuss the strategic importance of Taiwan is a delicate task. It is in itself delicate to discuss any strategy openly. Strategy is based on calculation of naked national interests. It is irrelevant to current norms or ethics of international conduct or ethics. If not unethical, it could be discourteous. “He is neither rich nor promising. Therefore, I wouldn’t think of marrying him.” Any lady has the right to think so. But it is definitely impolite to explicitly say so.

When one refrains from discussing strategy, however, quite often, one forgets the importance of strategic thinking. After the Russo-Japanese War, strategy was not taught or discussed in military education because it was considered to be top-secret. They taught only battlefield strategy. Then gradually, nobody talked about grand strategy. They lost the memory of the vital role played by the Anglo-Japanese alliance. And, they believed that it was only the tremendous Japanese fighting spirit that won the war. Thus, all the military leaders eventually became strategic-idiot. That is a bitter reflection of the wartime Japan after the disastrous defeat.

In diplomacy as well, diplomats quite often concentrate on producing “position papers” for briefing prime ministers and foreign ministers on current affairs, with much attention to bilateral courtesy and public reaction, and stop thinking about anything beyond.

I cannot help but have the impression that recent American Taiwan policy has also been fossilized in “position papers,” which do not provide us any clue to their underlying philosophy or strategy. Let me quote from a recent statement of Mr. Richard Hass, Director of Policy Planning Staff at the US Department of State, which is not particularly a bad example at all, but rather a typical one:

The United States is committed to its “one China” policy, as well as to longstanding obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act. We do not support Taiwan independence. We have an abiding interest, above all else, in the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait differences.

It is impossible to explain this remark in the light of American strategic thinking, although it can be explained by Chinese strategic thinking. Instead, it is absolutely explainable from the background of the past Sino-American diplomatic exchanges.

American position was first expressed in the US-China Communique of 1972 and confirmed and gradually modified over and over again between the two countries for the past thirty years. In that process, the Chinese have modified the expression inch by inch in their favor. The US, while explaining to itself and to the third party, “No substantial change from what the US had already said,” repeated unilateral concessions to China for the reason of “common defense against the Soviet threat,” preventing the then deteriorating Sino-American relationship,” or “making a presidential visit successful.”

In that process, American position moved from an objective reflection of the situation at the time of Shanghai comminuque, that is; The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of China, to the position of “American support of one China policy and non-support of Taiwan independence.”

This is the result of the accumulation of “no change in the fundamental posture” and “no unnecessary friction with China”, and is definitely impossible to explain by the philosophy or strategic thinking of the US for the long-term peace and stability of Asia.

Now, let us turn to the strategic value of Taiwan.

Strategy requires thinking in long-terms and taking account of all possible contingencies. One of recommendable approaches is to consider extreme cases first in discussing strategy and then examine more realistic conditions. If you start with current affairs, it is hard to have a long-term vision. A typical example is the post-war debate on Japanese defense. “In case of a war? is the most basic assumption for any strategist. But for the post-war Japan, you have had to overcome various arguments, such as, “Peaceful solution should be sought first,” or “Why do you believe current international relations are so grave?” After all, you will have ended up with no time to discuss strategy, never reaching defense strategy.

We can even define strategists as those who always have extreme cases in mind. Just as philosophers or the religious think about the question of life and death even in their normal life, strategists always think almost unnecessarily far and deep.

Let us start thinking from an extreme case where China has succeeded in getting Taiwan in full control.

As a method of annexation of Taiwan, we may exclude direct use of force because it means a scenario of a Sino-American war, but not necessarily that of successful annexation of Taiwan by China. Quite likely, annexation would be the result of political and psychological pressure. Certainly, threat of force has to be behind it, but it will take a form in which the US at that time would find it difficult to convince its public opinion for necessary intervention. Also, it may not take a direct form of annexation at first, but begin with Hong Kong style “one nation, two systems,” and gradually proceed to full annexation. Anyway, we presume an extreme case of China getting Taiwan in complete control.

II: The impact of China’s annexation of Taiwan

The first concern of Japan in such an eventuality would be over sealanes of communications in East Asia. It is a natural reaction for Japan, which is unable to self-supply food and other vital raw material.

During the Cold War, Japan felt, it was the northern and eastern sealanes that are insecure under the constant threat of the Soviet submarines and long-range bombers. On the other hand, the southwestern sealanes, which are the most important for Japan, remained quite safe. This was because of Taiwan’s geopolitical position.

China lacks deep waters, particularly on its East China Sea coastline where China’s important naval bases backed by industrial capacity are located. Therefore, Chinese submarines have to sail on the surface for a considerable distance and dive near the Ryukyu Archipelagoes in order to operate in the Pacific. As a result, Chinese submarines are presently not a serious threat. In contrast, Taiwan’s east coast is directly faced with the deepest sea in the Pacific. If China controlled Taiwan, China could utilize Taiwanese ports for submarines to operate freely throughout the Western Pacific.

The question of sealanes is more serious in the South China Sea. China has an extensive claim for territorial waters in that area. Occupation of Taiwan means control of the northern entrance of the South China Sea. Then, the large part of the South China Sea would become a kind of China’s inner water. If China claims exclusive jurisdictions there, in case of emergency, the only safe seaplane for Japan in Asia will be the passage through the Lomboc Strait in Indonesia through the east coast of the Philippines.

What is vital to Japan’s interests, however, is not limited to the question of oil routes to the Middle East, because in an extreme case, Japanese ships could reach the Gulf by going around the south of Australia.

What is more important is the political impact of China’s annexation of Taiwan on Southeast Asian countries, which have been Japan’s economic stronghold. Among Southeast Asian countries, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Brunei have no exit to the sea except through the South China Sea. Most Malaysian ports face the South China Sea. Therefore, these countries have vital interest in the South China Sea.

In the 1980s, Thai Prime Minister Chachai once expressed concern about China’s advance to the South China Sea and openly proposed Thai-Japan joint naval exercises. Japan responded with silence as usual. This negative reaction gradually induced Thailand to other alternative, that is, accommodation of China. The entire control of the regional nations’ outlet to the sea would be one of China’s useful tools of Finlandizing these nations. Finlandization of Southeast Asian nations by China will undermine Japan?s vital interests.

There still exists a more important question. The overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia are now divided into pro-Beijing, pro-Taiwan, and neutral groups. However, China’s control of Taiwan would make this division disappear. This may happen even under the interim period of “one state, two systems,” short of complete control of Taiwan.

Southeast Asian governments used to govern the oversea Chinese by utilizing this division, but this will no longer be available. In the past, China, while showing strong interest in the defense of interests of the overseas Chinese, has been extremely cautious, considering countereffects of Chinese intervention. As China’s Finlandization of Southeast Asian governments proceed, China would have a freer hand. Also, the local overseas Chinese will feel freer to resist the existing discriminatory policy of local governments.

In Indonesia, the overseas Chinese govern the economy. We have to expect that their political influence will increase reflecting their economic influence. In Malaysia, China will show more sympathy toward the local Chinese who have always complained of racism by the local governments.

Posture of Singapore may also change. Singapore has maintained a policy of independence from China, having achieved a unique law-abiding society and high standards of living, while it has quite often showed pro-Chinese gestures, reflecting its racial affinity. Singapore?s fundamental geopolitical conditions are that Singapore is an isolated island in the sea of the Malay races and that Singapore has to be cautious not to offend to the neighboring countries. If Chinese influence extends to the South China Sea and Southeast Asia, Singapore will find it no longer necessary to play low-key in the region. If Singapore sways to pro-China, Chinese control of the South China Sea will be complete with Taiwan in the north and Singapore in the south.

Finally, any scenario in which Taiwan will be put in Chinese control means that the US did not or could not intervene for one reason or another. This means, in turn, the collapse of American credibility. It is predictable under this circumstance that the entire Southeast Asian public opinion would be swayed toward pro-China.

III: The historical significance

The above development means a return to the status quo ante of 1965. Before that time, Southeast Asia had been under the threat of communist insurgencies since the end of the Second World War. Prince Shihanouk of Cambodia was definitely pro-Beijing. Indonesia was on the eve of communist takeover. There was the Beijing-Phnom Pen-Jakarta axis against the US. Many Southeast Asian nations were resigned to the eventual communist takeover. In 1965, the American Marine Corps landed on Vietnamese soil. Although the American Vietnam campaign eventually failed, America?s act gave Southeast Asian nations the courage to resist communists. In September, the communist coup in Indonesia failed. Southeast Asian nations formed ASEAN in 1967. This was the beginning of the present stability and prosperity of Southeast Asia. In short, American withdrawal from Taiwan annihilates all the American efforts since 1965, including the tremendous sacrifice made during the Vietnam War.

China’s threat has often been debated. Those who deny the threat usually forecast the Chinese economic and military power in the future and draw a conclusion that China cannot possibly match the US in strength in the coming decades. They may be right. However, If China annexed an industrially advanced and prosperous Taiwan, controlled the entire region of Southeast Asia, and extended its influence as far as the West Pacific and the Indian Ocean, China would be a formidable challenger to American hegemony.

This would be historically significant. China has always been the greatest empire in the world in the past thousand years. It was weakened in the modern times mainly because it lost all of its hinterlands to Western imperialism from the 17th to 19th century. The Russians took Siberia. West European powers governed South and Southeast Asia. Japan and the US controlled China’s exit to the Pacific by colonizing Taiwan and Philippines. Therefore, Chinese annexation of Taiwan, and the eventual increase of Chinese influence on Southeast Asia, may well mean the revival of the Chinese worldwide empire.

Regarding Japan, in past half century, it has spent tremendous efforts and resources to establish economic relations with Southeast Asian nations. As stated above, however, Japan did not respond to their security needs and concentrated on trade and investment, thus making Japanese influence in the region shallow and vulnerable. The loss of Southeast Asia will be a huge blow to the Japanese economy.

IV: What is the strategic implication?

As stated above, the outcome of Chinese annexation of Taiwan will be far-reaching. America and Japan should always bear in mind this strategic importance of Taiwan. It may be, however, more important for China to recognize it.

The public normally ignores strategic value until they face a real crisis. However, one can never underestimate the reaction of the public when they suddenly recognize strategic implications. China has achieved a great diplomatic success. Since the Shanghai Communique, China has been successful in making American diplomacy retreat a long way on words. Finally, the US committed to “one China” policy, which the US had not committed to at the time of the signing of the communique. But China should be prepared for America’s reaction when China really tries to make “one China” come true. The reaction is not limited to the US. Japan and Southeast Asian nations might also react sharply when faced with this strategic truth even after China will have already achieved a kind of Finladization.

China may claim the ethical and nationalistic right to annex Taiwan, quoting the history of humiliation one hundred years ago. China may argue for its legal right, quoting all of America’s verbal commitment to “one China” as well as various principles of the current international law. Facing the strategic reality, however, these arguments may suddenly become powerless.

In the past four centuries, no challenger successfully defeated Anglo-America hegemony. The Spaniard and the Dutch lost their empires, the French lost India and Canada, the Germans lost half of their territory, the Japanese lost their empire, and finally, the Russians lost all their gains since Peter the Great. China is almost the only remaining empire in the world, possessing Tibet, Uigure, Mongolia, etc. If China challenged Anglo-American hegemony unsuccessfully, it is quite predictable that China would lose its empire.

China may conceive the annexation of Taiwan to be merely an achievement of the final goal of Chinese nationalism. It may, however, be the beginning of a deadly, perhaps fatal, confrontation with a world hegemon.

賴怡忠
本文作者是馬偕醫護管理專科學校助理教授

賴怡忠 Oct 12, 2013

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